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The American philosopher Alexander Meikeljohn famously reacted to the 
news of the Supreme Court's decision in Sullivan by saying, "It is an occasion for danc-
ing in the streets." 1 There is something disturbing and perhaps even vaguely repellent 
in the image of a giddy throng of philosophers, media lawyers and law professors get-
ting jiggy with it on the boulevards of America over the enunciation of the "actual 
malice" doctrine. As both a professor and a former newspaper editor I would join that 
ungainly celebration. Sullivan has been a good thing on balance for free press, free 
speech and free government. But as a human being, I can't help but wonder whether 
Ralph David Abernathy ever felt like joining the dance. 
Abernathy was one of four local defendants sued by L.B. Sullivan over the ad-
vertisement: the others were 5.5. Seay Sr. of Montgomery, Fred L. Shuttlesworth of 
Birmingham and J.E. Lowery of Mobile.2 Each of these men was an important figure in 
the civil rights movement. Abernathy, for example, was Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.' s 
right hand man in the operation of the Southern Christian Leadership Council- so 
much so that when King left Montgomery in 1960, he immediately began beseeching 
Abernathy to come to Atlanta with him. Abernathy had a complex relationship with 
King. He understandably felt overshadowed and ignored in the adulation given to 
King, but he stuck with SCLC throughout the King years. When King was assassi-
nated in 1968, Abernathy was given the impossible task of taking up King's cross and 
carrying it into the chaos of the late '60s and the Nixon era. The other three were also 
men with substantial careers in the Southern Civil Rights Movement; they were im-
• Orlando John and Marian H. Hollis Professor of Law, University of Oregon. This essay is adapted from a 
speech, delivered at "New York Times Co. v. Sullivan Forty Years After: Its Impact on Freedom of the Press in 
the United States and Abroad," delivered at a conference jointly sponsored by the University of Oregon 
School of Law and the University of Oregon School of Journalism and Communication, October 8, 2004, in 
Eugene, Oregon. I thank Deans Timothy Gleason and Laird Kirkpatrick and conference organizer Kyou Ho 
Youm for their invitation. Patricia Bradwell, Alissa Gibson, and Jessica Freeman contributed research to this 
essay. One other colleague encouraged me in the project and read the text before it was delivered. She 
knows who she is. 
1 ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE No LAW 154 (1991). 
2 Id. at 11-12. 
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portant before the Sullivan case and continued to be important after it. During the 
early '60s, I, as a young white teenager in Virginia, had heard three of the names-
Abernathy, Shuttlesworth and Lowery-repeatedly spoken in tones of derision and 
anger by white neighbors who were struggling to preserve segregation. These four 
ministers were the men who made the history that Claude Sitton of The New York Times 
recorded. And yet there is not one word about any of them in the Sullivan opinion. In-
deed, Abernathy's name appears in the caption only.3 Seay, Shuttlesworth and Lowery 
do not receive even the dignity of a mention in the caption; they are in Brennan's opin-
ion known only as "individual petitioners." Beyond that, their case raised distinct civil 
liberties and civil rights issues as profound as did the case against the Times. And 
there is virtually no discussion of those issues in the opinion or in the literature that 
has grown up to celebrate and explain it. Indeed, as I search the scholarly legal litera-
ture on Sullivan, more has been written abut L.B. Sullivan, the plaintiff police commis-
sioner of Montgomery, and the other white plaintiffs than about the effect of this 
defamation lawsuit on the individual defendants: 
How did they get involved in the case? Bayard Rustin, that fascinating, chilly 
and peculiarly Northern Movement leader, added their names to Heed Their Rising 
Voices without their permission-and without even notifying them.s They had never 
seen or heard of the advertisement until they received a letter from L. B. Sullivan de-
manding that they take out another full-page ad to disavow it. About ten days later 
they were sued.6 
They denied that they had published the article and there was no real evi-
dence at trial that they had. But the judge simply refused to rule on their motions to 
dismiss. 
In the official record - and in Anthony Lewis's wonderful book, Make No 
Law - it is stated that the only reason they were sued was to destroy diversity jurisdic-
tion, so that Sullivan and the other libel plaintiffs could make sure their cases were 
heard in Alabama state court. In Parks v. Abernathy, a companion case, Judge Frank 
Johnson dismissed them as "fraudulently joined," on the grounds that no theory un-
der Alabama law could make them liable for the advertisement. The Fifth Circuit, 
however, ordered them restored.7 
But was the joinder really fraudulent? Or is this an example of seeing things 
anachronistically and in a press-centered way, assuming that the Times and the na-
3 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 US. 254 (1964). 
4 See, e.g., Kermit Hall, ,. Lies, Lies, Lies"; The origins a/New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 9 Comm. L. & Pol'y 
391 (2004). 
5 Lewis, supra note 1, at 31, Hall, supra note 4, at 37. 
6 Petition's Reply to Respondent's Brief in Opposition at 8, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.s. 254 
(1964) (No. 40). 
7 Parks v. New York Times Co., 195 F. Supp. 919, 925 (M.D. Ala 1961), rev'd 308 F.2d 474 (5th CiT. 1962). 
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tional media were the only game worth bagging by the plaintiffs? Does the "fraudu-
lent joinder" issue not reduce them to mere objects, tools to be used in getting the 
"real" defendants? Isn't it a reflection of the "Mississippi Burning" theory of the 
Movement, which retells the story as one of passive black Southerners being rescued 
by heroic white moderates, FBI agents and journalists?8 
Certainly the state of Alabama was doing everything it could to shut down the 
NAACP (outlawed at the time) and the SCLC and to cripple and destroy its leaders. 
Though removal might have been a consideration, the prospect of terrorizing 
and bankrupting these Southern black leaders might have been a separate and impor-
tant aim. The four were pursued with vindictiveness. First, the trial judge refused to 
rule on their motion for a new trial, and then claimed they had waived it. He permit-
ted levy against their property. Abernathy'S, Lowery'S and Shuttlesworth's cars were 
seized and sold at auction. Real estate belonging to Abernathy and Seay was attached. 
This was not symbolic-it was real. "At stake." Taylor Branch notes, "were family 
treasures of relatively prosperous men." This was official lawlessness, government 
terror, state-sponsored theft,; and the national press, intimidated by the libel suits 
brought against it, giving virtually no coverage. As Taylor Branch wrote, "the stories 
played no better than blurbs."9 
As state intimidation against individuals with little institutional protection, 
these tactics partially worked. Abernathy took the Georgia pulpit that King had urged 
on him, and Fred Shuttlesworth left the South altogether, accepting a call from a 
church in Cincinnati.10 
These individual litigants were dragged into a quarrel by their own" ally" 
without permission, joined to a potentially ruinous lawsuit by their mortal enemy who 
demanded a "retraction" they could not give and he would not have accepted, and 
found liable by a racist court system without any opportunity to offer a meaningful 
defense. Their arguments-the shadow arguments that the Supreme Court never even 
acknowledged-were as important to the freedom of our nation as the Times's free 
press argument. Those arguments did not, however, relate to the concerns of wealthy 
corporations but to those of poor Southern blacks. "Freedom of the press," A.J. Lie-
bling wrote, "is guaranteed only to those who own one."11 The freedom that the "indi-
vidual petitioners" sought was more basic to the lives of those who did not visit or 
report on the South, but who lived under the white Southern boot day after day. 
Here are the questions presented from the four ministers' petition for certio-
rari: 
8 Don't see Mississippi Burning (Orion Pictures 1988). 
9 TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA DURING THE KING YEARS 1954-63 386 ( 1988). 
10 Id. at 580. 
11 A.J. Liebling, "Do You Belong in Journalism?", The New Yorker, May 14, 1960 at 109]. 
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"Were the rights of the four Negro petitioners herein to equal protection and 
due process of law, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, in that the 
suit brought against them for alleged libel by respondent Sullivan, a white 
public official of Montgomery, was tried in a Courtroom wherein racial seg-
regation of whites and Negroes was enforced and which was permeated with 
an atmosphere of racial bias, passion and hostile community pressures? 
"Were the rights of the petitioners to due process of law and to a fair and im-
partial trial under the Fourteenth Amendment violated and abridged by a 
trial before an all white jury resulting from the intentional and systematic ex-
clusion of Negro citizens, and before a trial judge ... who on February 1, 1961, 
while motions for new trial in the instant case were pending undecided before 
him, stated from the Bench during the trial of a related libel suit before him 
that the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States constitution is inappli-
cable in proceedings in Alabama State court, which he stated are governed by 
'white man's justice'?"12 
2005 
The ministers also asked in their briefs whether it was prejudicial for the at-
torney for the plaintiffs, in speaking to the all-white jury, to refer to the four ministers 
as "nigras" over their protests; and whether it was prejudicial to allow a plaintiff's 
closing that included these words to the all white jury: "In other words, all of these 
things that happened did not happen in Russia where the police run everything, they 
did not happen in the Congo where they still eat them, they happened in Montgomery, 
Alabama, a law-abiding community."13 
These questions went to the very heart of Southern apartheid, the totalitarian 
racial caste system whose workings I remember vividly-a system that depended 
upon the systematic exclusion, stigmatization, and dehumanization of black Southern-
ers by the action of law. The ministers did not seek the freedom to discuss segregation; 
they sought to destroy it. 
Here is the United States Supreme Court's entire discussion of these issues: 
"Since we sustain the contentions of all the petitioners under the First Amendment's 
guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press as applied to the States by the Four-
teenth Amendment, we do not decide the questions presented by the other claims of 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The individual petitioners contend that the 
judgment against them offends the Due Process Clause because there was no evidence 
to show that they had published or authorized the publication of the alleged libel, and 
that the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses were violated by racial segregation 
and racial bias in the courtroom." 14 
12 Petition for Certiorari at 2-3, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.s. 254 (1964) (No. 39). 
13 Petitioners' Brief at 54, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.s. 254 (1964) (No. 40) (emphasis added). 
14 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 264 n. 4. 
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To be sure, the Court had already held that courtroom segregation was unlaw-
ful. In Johnson v. Virginia,15 it had said a year earlier: "it is no longer open to question 
that a State may not constitutionally require segregation of public facilities."16 That 
case established that a black American, arrested for peaceably refusing to sit in the area 
of the courtroom reserved for blacks, would be released by federal court order. But the 
petitioners were asking for something more radical- a holding that such racial segre-
gation so tainted the atmosphere that defendants, even if they did not choose to risk 
beating or even death in jail for defying courtroom segregation, were denied a fair trial 
when subjected to judicial apartheid, no matter what the cause of action. And from the 
vantage point of 2004, I defy anyone to say that they were wrong. 
Can it really be said with a straight face that the four ministers got their day in 
court before either the state or the federal courts? 
Oh, to be sure, Abernathy and the others won - they got their property back. 
They have no real grounds for complaint. 
And, to be sure, the Court had reasons for its reticence. Important reasons. 
Lawyer's reasons. Prudential reasons. Institutional limitations, procedural considera-
tions, worries about federalism, concerns over the attitude of the executive branch, 
ripeness, mootness, justiciability - all the soothing words lawyers and judges use to 
blur transcendent moral and political issues were no doubt whispered in the Justices' 
ears. Perhaps the time was not right to consider such an explosive set of issues. Justice 
Brennan was constrained by the rule of five - the need to keep a majority behind him. 
There were many issues before the court. The country was tense. One had to proceed 
cautiously, the Court itself was divided. The black defendants' lawyers may not have 
preserved-or perhaps had not been allowed to preserve-these questions with crys-
tal clarity. 
But can we doubt that the four ministers nonetheless hungered for - and sub 
specie eternitatis, deserved -vindication on the issues they had identified? 
To be sure, the national media did continue to report the civil rights story-
but for years after Sullivan, they were reporting on events in courtrooms where even 
the Bibles were segregated. 
To be sure, the Court reached the right result. But isn't it curious that it relied 
on the Alien and Sedition Acts to reach that result, instead of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment? I have spent the past three years studying the Fourteenth Amendment and I 
conclude that Sullivan concerned the precise evil the Amendment was framed to 
15 Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.s. 61 (1963). 
16 Id. at 62. 
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avoid - a racial caste system entrenching itself by denying basic dignity and freedom 
of speech and press. 
Isn't it worth wondering why the court invoked Jefferson-a slaveowner and 
an advocate of states' rights-as its authority for the application of the First Amend-
ment against the states? Why, for example, did Brennan not quote John Bingham, an 
Abolitionist and the chief author of section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment? John 
Bingham, bless his rock-ribbed Buckeye anti-slavery heart, viewed the struggle against 
Southern racial autocracy as part of God's plan for the perfection of American republi-
canism; Bingham viewed as the chief crime of the Slave Power its refusal to allow free 
speech that criticized its racial caste system; Bingham insisted that the Bill of Rights 
must be applied to the states; Bingham is chiefly responsible for the fact that it does so 
today. In his enmity toward Southern racial tyranny, Bingham was passionate, not 
cool; evangelical, not philosophical or temporizing like Jefferson. Bingham spoke a 
language far closer to that of King and Abernathy than to that of Hume and Locke. On 
the floor of the House in 1857, he told his colleagues that God's whole creation was 
watching the struggle for Southern freedom. 
It is the high heaven of the nineteenth century. The whole heavens are filled 
with the light of a new and better day. Kings hold their power with a tremu-
lous and unsteady hand. The bastil[IJes and dungeons of tyrants, those graves 
of human liberty, are giving up their dead ... the mighty heart of the world 
stands still, awaiting the resurrection of the nations, and that final triumph of 
the right, foretold in prophecy and invoked in song." 
To be sure, something very like the resurrection of this nation did take place, 
piecemeal. Today throughout the region, even the courtroom bibles are desegregated. 
Black Americans had waited 100 years for that. Many generations had suffered and 
died without a shred of hope that help was on the way. The Court, to be sure, gave 
them help. 
But when they read the Sullivan opinion, I wonder whether Abernathy, Low-
ery, Shuttlesworth and Seay felt that justice had rolled down like waters, and right-
eousness like a mighty stream. 
To be sure, as we celebrate the anniversary of this decision that repudiated se-
ditious libel, we have every reason to feel satisfied. 
And as we-philosophers, lawyers, professors-invite the heirs of the four 
black defendants to join us in celebrating a case that could have dismantled courtroom 
segregation but for a variety of no doubt important reasons did not, I am sure they 
will graciously join in. 
17 ERVING BEAUREGARD, BINGHAM OF TIIE HILLS: POLITIOAN AND DIPLOMAT EXTRAORDINARY 35 (1989). 
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But perhaps we should not expect them to dance. 
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